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In the Matter of the estate of John W. Bowlds, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 100 
(December 29, 2004).1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – ESTATE, GIFT & TRUST LAW 
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal from both parties regarding a court’s review of fee agreements between an 
estate and its attorneys.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
  
 Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.  The court 
reversed the district court’s approval of the fee arrangement and remanded it for further 
consideration of the reasonableness of the law firm’s charges.  The district court’s denial of the 
executor’s professional fees and reimbursement for fees related to retaining a second law firm 
was upheld, as well as the order that deducted the brokerage sales commissions over 1 percent.  
The court remanded this portion of its decision so that the district court could impose joint and 
several liability against the Crises for the excess brokerage commissions assessed against Kyle & 
Kyle. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 John Bowlds died in 1999 with an estate worth over seven million dollars.  The will 
gifted a majority of Bowlds’ estate to The American Cancer Society (ACS) (Respondents), and  
named his tax preparers, Cris and Cathy Cris (hereinafter “the Crises”), executors of the will.  
The Crises retained the law firm of Kyle & Kyle to help them administer the estate.  The 
agreement between the Crises and the law firm, in accordance with custom and practice in Clark 
County, provided the firm would receive five percent of the gross value of the estate, and an 
additional $250 per hour for “extraordinary fees.”   
 
 The estate’s administration was relatively straightforward, requiring satisfaction of one 
creditor’s claim, liquidation of highly marketable securities, and the distribution of property in 
two states.  Instead of using their own brokers, Kyle & Kyle advised the Crises to sell the 
securities through three separate brokers; two charging sales commissions of 5%, and the other 
charging 1 percent.  The executors sought approval of an amended accounting for a variety of 
expenses, including extraordinary administrative and accounting services, extraordinary attorney 
fees, the brokerage fees, and the five percent attorneys fees. 
 
 The ACS objected to the accounting, including (1) the fee arrangement with Kyle & Kyle 
was unreasonable, (2) the extraordinary attorney fees were unjustifiable, (3) the fees in excess of 
statutory fees involved services that executors typically provided, (4) the Crises breached their 
fiduciary duties by paying excessive brokerage fees, and (5) the Crises mishandled the estate’s 
federal tax returns. 
                                                 
1 By Kristen T. Gallagher 
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 Upon ACS’s challenge to their accounting, the Crises retained another attorney, Cary 
Colt Payne, Es q., to represent them.  The executors requested reimbursement for Payne’s 
attorney fees.  
 
 The district court approved the five percent fee arrangement with Kyle & Kyle.  
Additionally, (1) the lower court determined that Kyle & Kyle improperly advised the Crises 
regarding the three separate brokerage commissions and deducted the commissions that were 
over 1 percent from Kyle & Kyle’s attorney fees; (2) the court awarded the Crises extraordinary 
professional & bookkeeping fees, albeit on a reduced basis; (3) the court denied Kyle & Kyle’s 
request for extraordinary fees; and (4) the court denied the Cris’s request for reimbursement of 
attorney Payne’s fees.   
 
 On appeal, the executors challenged the denial of extraordinary attorney fees, the fees for 
attorney Payne’s services, and the partial denial of the non-statutory professional and 
bookkeeping fees.  The ACS’s cross-appeal challenged the lower court’s grant of the 5 percent  
attorney fee agreement, and the court’s decision to subtract the brokerage commissions only 
from Kyle & Kyle’s attorney fees.  
 
Discussion 
 
1. Reasonable attorney fees in Clark County 
 
The Crises argued the 5 percent basic fee arrangement was reasonable per se because it 
was based on the local custom and practice in Clark County.  Specifically, they argued that 
typical fee arrangements range from five to eight percent.  However, a local probate expert 
testified that because the Bowlds estate only required routine and simple administration, the fee 
was too high.  The expert further testified that the 5 percent fee agreement was unreasonable 
pursuant to NRS 150.0602 and SCR 155.3  Conversely, the Clark County Probate Commissioner 
testified on behalf of Kyle & Kyle and stated that he recommends approval of 5 percent fee 
arrangements over half of the time, although not believing these arrangements are per se 
reasonable. 
                                                 
2 NRS 150.060(1) states, in pertinent part: Attorneys for personal representatives are entitled to reasonable 
compensation for their services, to be paid out of the decedent’s estate.  The amount must be fixed by agreement 
between the personal representative and the attorney, subject to approval by the court, after petition, notice and 
hearing as provided in subsection 2.  
3 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 155(1) states, in pertinent part: 1. A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.  The 1. A lawyer's fee shall 
be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
(a) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,  
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(b) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular  
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(d) The amount involved and the results obtained; 
(e) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the  
services; and 
(h) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
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 ACS asserted, according to NRS 150.060, a district court is not required to enforce 
agreements between estate and attorney, and must review it for reasonableness under SCR 155.  
Based on the information in the record, the court could not determine if this agreement was 
reasonable.  Although the fee agreement was customary under SCR 155(1), this factor alone did 
not guarantee reasonableness, and must evaluate the agreement based on NRS 150.060.  Because 
the lower court did not review this agreement for reasonableness, the court remanded for further 
consideration.   
 
2. Extraordinary attorney fees 
 
In addition to the 5 percent arrangement, Kyle & Kyle could submit hourly charges for  
extraordinary fees.4  The court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied the request because most of the extraordinary fees the firm charged were the sort 
expected of probate attorneys.  Additionally, because the 5 percent fee arrangement was so 
generous, there was little room to approve additional fees.  However, the court noted that this 
request may have been denied because of the 5 percent fee arrangement approval, and indicated 
the district court can consider all relevant SCR 155 factors when approving a reasonable fee 
package for the estate’s attorneys. 
 
3. Assessment of Brokerage Commissions Against Kyle & Kyle 
 
The executors’ personal stockbroker, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, was willing to  
liquidate the stocks for a 1 percent commission; however, Kyle & Kyle opted to split the 
transaction among three different companies.  The brokerage commissions would have been 
substantially less if the executors had kept the stocks together.  In fact, Mr. Cris made no attempt 
at negotiating a lower brokerage fee despite having experience as a licensed stockbroker and 
knowing that commission fees varied within the industry.  Mr. Kyle testified that he chose the 
two brokerage houses that charged the 5 percent commission, with one of those firms serving as 
his personal broker, and the other serving as a former employer.   
 
The court determined that although a personal representative of an estate may rely on 
advise from counsel, Mr. Cris was a licensed stockbroker for twenty years and he should not 
have relied on Kyle & Kyle’s recommendation without further negotiation or inquiry.  Further, 
the court commented on the executors’ fiduciary duty to protect estate assets and decided that the 
lower court erred in failing to hold the Crises jointly and severally liable for the excess 
commissions. 
 
4. Fees for the Executor’s Accounting Services  
 
The Crises appealed the lower court’s reduction of their request for professional and  
                                                 
4 The arrangement provided that extraordinary fees included time spent in trial, pretrial conferences, hearing or 
meetings with court or court personnel, research, settlement negotiations, conferences, discovery, investigation, 
filing suit or activities on behalf of the client to settle his/her claims, including any ancillary probate proceedings 
which may be required in Louisiana (where the other parcel of property was located) or any other state. 
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bookkeeping fees.  Pursuant to NRS 150.030,5 a personal representative may recover expenses 
for extraordinary services, but a district court holds that discretion.  The court determined the 
district court did not abuse its discretion. 
 
5. Fees for Alternative Counsel 
 
The Crises argued the district court abused its discretion in denying payment of  
Payne’s attorney fees because NRS 132.135 allows the fees of “any attorney retained” by a 
personal representative of the estate.  However, the court determined that SCR 178(1)(b) 
controlled this situation.  A lawyer may only act as an advocate at trial where he is likely to be a 
witness when the testimony “relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the 
case.”  Mr. Kyle’s testimony related to the nature of the legal services.  Accordingly, there was 
not a conflict regarding the fee arrangement that required the Crises to hire additional counsel. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A basic fee arrangement is not reasonable per se, and a district court must review it for 
reasonableness under the guidance of NRS 150.060(1) and SCR 155.  Not only will the estate’s 
counsel be held responsible for excessive brokerage fees, but the estate’s personal 
representatives will be if the executor has prior expertise in that industry. 
                                                 
5 NRS 150.030 states that further allowances may be made as the court deems just and reasonable for any 
extraordinary services, such as: 
1. Management, sales or mortgages of real or personal property. 
   2. Contested or litigated claims against the estate. 
    3. The adjustment and payments of extensive or complicated estate taxes. 
4. Litigation in regard to the property of the estate. 
5. The carrying on of the decedent's business pursuant to an order of the court. 
6. Such other litigation or special services as may be necessary for the personal  
representative to prosecute, defend or perform. 
